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The Juvenile Death Penalty in Washington:
A State Constitutional Analysis
Bruce L. Brown*
On February 6, 1990, a Kitsap county jury found Michael
Monroe Furman guilty of aggravated first degree murder.1 On
March 6, 1990, the trial court sentenced Furman to death.2 At
the time of the murder, Furman was seventeen years and ten
months old.3 He was, therefore, a juvenile as defined by Wash-
ington statute.4 Furman is the first juvenile to be sentenced to
death in Washington since 1932, and his sentence is unique
among all of the juvenile murder cases filed under the current
statute.5
Furman's appeal is currently pending before the Washing-
ton State Supreme Court.6 In that appeal, Furman asserts that
the imposition of the death penalty for a crime committed
while a juvenile is cruel punishment that violates Article 1,
Section 14 of the Washington Constitution.7 This Article
argues that Furman should prevail.
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would like to thank Shelly Crocker, Kit Kinports, Donna Masumoto, Colleen
O'Connor, and Clark Shores for their comments on drafts of this Article. The opinions
reflected in the Article are, of course, solely those of the Author.
1. Clerk's Papers at 904-07, State v. Furman, No. 57003-5 (Wash. filed June 4,
1990). The clerk's papers and briefs filed in this case are available for inspection by
contacting the Clerk of the Supreme Court in Olympia, Washington.
2. Id. at 1135. See infra notes 20-35 and accompanying text for a description of the
statutory death penalty scheme in Washington.
3. Brief of Respondent at 10, State v. Furman, No. 57003-5 (Wash. filed June 4,
1990).
4. A "juvenile" is "any individual under the age of eighteen years." Wash. Rev.
Code § 13.34.030(1) (1989). In this Article, "juvenile" refers to the age of the person at
the time of the offense.
5. See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text. The uniqueness of Furman's
sentence is not changed by the fact that he was almost eighteen at the time of his
offense. This Article argues that the Washington Supreme Court should draw a
bright-line rule prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles.
6. See supra note 1.
7. Article 1, Section 14, of the Washington Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted."
Because the United States Supreme Court has indicated that the federal constitution
does not bar the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles (see infra notes 14-20 and
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The Washington Supreme Court should hold that Article
1, Section 14 bars the execution of juveniles for numerous rea-
sons. First, the Washington State Constitution provides
greater protection to juveniles than the United States Consti-
tution.' Second, applying the death penalty to juveniles serves
no valid legislative purpose because that penalty has no deter-
rent or retributive value.9 Third, no legislative declaration
expressly states that the death penalty should apply to
juveniles. Absent such a declaration, the court should not
abdicate its state constitutional responsibility to protect indi-
viduals. Fourth, in other jurisdictions and in foreign countries,
the trend is to not apply the death penalty to juveniles.10
Finally, as noted above, Furman's sentence is unique among
recent juvenile murderers."
This Article first briefly examines the United States
Supreme Court cases dealing with the juvenile death penalty.
Second, the Article describes the history and structure of
Washington's death penalty statute. Third, the Article ana-
lyzes whether the state constitution's ban on cruel punishment
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles.
Such a state constitutional analysis necessarily requires
examination of two issues. Because the U.S. Supreme Court
has upheld the constitutionality of applying the death penalty
to persons sixteen years or older, the threshold issue is
whether the Washington Constitution provides greater protec-
tion to juveniles between sixteen and eighteen years of age. In
analyzing this threshold issue, the Article applies the reason-
ing of State v. Gunwall'2 and concludes that Washington's
Constitution does provide greater protection than its federal
counterpart.
The second issue is whether the juvenile death penalty
violates the Washington Constitution's ban on cruel punish-
ment. Applying the four-part test enunciated in State v.
accompanying text), Furman's argument focuses solely on the state constitutional
issue.
8. See infra notes 46-81 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 94-118 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 122-41 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
12. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). See infra text accompanying notes 41-42
for Gunwall's six-factor test. In Gunwall, the Court held that the state constitution's
privacy clause provides greater protection to an individual's right to privacy than does
the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution. 106 Wash. 2d at 64-67, 720 P.2d at
814-15.
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Fain,3 this Article concludes that the Washington Constitu-
tion's ban on cruel punishment prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty on juveniles. Thus, the Washington Supreme
Court should vacate Furman's death sentence.
I. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND THE JUVENILE
DEATH PENALTY
The United States Supreme Court has twice addressed
whether the Eighth Amendment 4 prohibits imposing the
death penalty on juveniles. In Thompson v. Oklahoma,'" a plu-
rality of the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the execution of offenders who were under the age of sixteen
at the time of the offense.' 6 Justice O'Connor concurred on
nonconstitutional grounds.'7 One year later, in Stanford v.
Kentucky,'8 a different plurality held that the Eighth Amend-
ment does not bar imposing the death penalty on offenders
who were either sixteen- or seventeen-years-old at the time of
the offense. Once again, Justice O'Connor concurred in the
judgment. 9 Thus, the Supreme Court has indicated that the
13. 94 Wash. 2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980). Fain was convicted of being a habitual
criminal and was sentenced to life imprisonment on the basis of three convictions for
minor, nonviolent property crimes. I& at 402, 617 P.2d at 728. The court applied a
four-part test to determine whether Fain's punishment violated the state constitution's
ban on cruel punishment. See infra text at notes 81-82. The court held that Fain's
punishment violated Article 1, Section 14 of the state constitution. 94 Wash. 2d at 402,
617 P.2d at 728.
14. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
15. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
16. Id A plurality of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, held that
according to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society," the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment when applied to
persons under age sixteen. Id. at 821-33. In reaching its conclusions, the plurality
examined state statutes and jury determinations. Id. The plurality also noted the
opinions of professional organizations, common law nations, and other Western
European nations. Id.
17. Id. at 848. Though she disagreed with the plurality's holding that the death
penalty was unconstitutional as to juveniles below age sixteen, Justice O'Connor
argued that state statutes that do not specify a minimum age should not be used to
make fifteen-year-olds "death eligible," because the state legislatures' silence about the
minimum age might indicate a failure to address the issue. Id. at 856-59. Thus,
allowing application of the death penalty to juveniles below age sixteen might
constitute "death by legislative oversight." Id.
18. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
19. 1& A plurality of the Court, in an opinon by Justice Scalia, held that "evolving
standards of decency" were not violated by imposition of the death penalty on
juveniles aged sixteen or seventeen. In reaching its conclusions, the plurality noted
that the juvenile death penalty would not have been considered cruel and unusual in
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Eighth Amendment does not bar states from executing some-
one for an offense committed when the offender was sixteen
years old or older.
II. THE WASHINGTON DEATH PENALTY STATUTE
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court invalidated most
state death penalty statutes.' Shortly thereafter, the Wash-
ington State Supreme Court declared the Washington death
penalty statute unconstitutional."' Over the course of the next
decade, the Washington State Legislature failed in several
attempts to enact a constitutional death penalty statute.2 2
Finally in 1981, the legislature passed the current statute.23
The current statute permits the execution of anyone con-
victed of aggravated first degree murder. A person is guilty of
aggravated first degree murder if he or she commits premedi-
tated first degree murder,2' and a jury finds the existence of
one or more statutory aggravating circumstances. 5 If the State
the eighteenth century. Id. at 365. The plurality also found unpersuasive the
petitioners' proofs of the nation's "evolving standards," similar to those made in
Thompson, that thirty-three of thirty-seven states that permit capital punishment
preclude its application against sixteen- or seventeen-year-olds. Id. at 367-68. Finally,
the plurality found unpersuasive the Thompson-like argument that juries' refusal to
impose the juvenile death penalty indicated national consensus because such
arguments were better directed to the legislature than to the Court. Id. at 373-74, 380.
Justice O'Connor's concurrences in Thompson and Stanford are the swing votes in
those two cases. See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of her
opinions.
20. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
21. State v. Baker, 81 Wash. 2d 281, 501 P.2d 284 (1972).
22. See generally State v. Bartholomew, 98 Wash. 2d 173, 180-92, 654 P.2d 1170,
1175-80 (1982) (Bartholomew I), vacated, 463 U.S. 1203, cerL denied, 463 U.S. 1212
(1983); Leonie G. Hellwig, Comment, The Death Penalty in Washington: An
Historical Perspective, 57 WASH. L. REV. 525 (1982) (discussing the history of the death
penalty in Washington).
23. Act of May 14, 1981, 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 138 (codified as WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95 (1989)).
24. A person commits premeditated first degree murder when, while acting with
premeditated intent to cause the death of another, he or she causes the death of any
person. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030 (1989). Premeditation is the deliberate
formation of and reflection upon the intent to cause the death of another. State v.
Ollens, 107 Wash. 2d 848, 850, 733 P.2d 984, 986 (1987).
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.020 (1989). There are ten statutory aggravating
factors:
(1) The victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections officer, or fire
fighter who was performing his or her official duties at the time of the act
resulting in death and the victim was known or reasonably should have been
known by the person to be such at the time of the killing;
(2) At the time of the act resulting in the death, the person was serving a
term of imprisonment, had escaped, or was on authorized or unauthorized
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intends to seek the death penalty, it must file written notice of
that intent within thirty days of arraignment.2 6
A trial in which the State seeks the death penalty is
divided into two parts: the guilt phase and the penalty phase.
The court first empanels a jury to determine whether the
defendant is guilty of aggravated first degree murder.' If the
jury finds the defendant guilty, the trial court then reconvenes
the same jury to hear the special sentencing proceeding to
determine the penalty.
2
During the penalty phase, both the State and the defend-
leave in or from a state facility or program for the incarceration or treatment
of persons adjudicated guilty of crimes;
(3) At the time of the act resulting in death, the person was in custody in a
county or county-city jail as a consequence of having been adjudicated guilty
of a felony;
(4) The person committed the murder pursuant to an agreement that he or
she would receive money or any other thing of value for committing the
murder;
(5) The person solicited another person to commit the murder and had paid
or had agreed to pay money or any other thing of value for committing the
murder;
(6) The victim was:
(a) A judge; juror or former juror; prospective, current, or former witness in
an adjudicative proceeding;, prosecuting attorney; deputy prosecuting attorney;
defense attorney; a member of the board of prison terms and paroles; or a
probation or parole officer, and
(b) The murder was related to the exercise of official duties performed or to
be performed by the victim;
(7) The person committed the murder to conceal the commission of a crime
or to protect or conceal the identity of any person committing a crime;
(8) There was more than one victim and the murders were part of a common
scheme or plan or the result of a single act of the person;
(9) The murder was committed in the course of, in furtherance of, or in
immediate flight from one of the following crimes:
(a) Robbery in the first or second degree;
(b) Rape in the first or second degree;
(c) Burglary in the first or second degree;
(d) Kidnapping in the first or second degree; or
(e) Arson in the first or second degree;
(10) The victim was regularly employed or self-employed as a newsreporter
and the murder was committed to obstruct or hinder the investigative,
research or reporting activities of the victim.
Id. (footnote omitted).
26. Id. § 10.95.040.
27. As in all criminal proceedings, the defendant has a right to either plead guilty
or waive a jury trial and be tried by the court. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.95.050 (1989).
However, in every case under the current statute in which the State sought the death
penalty, the defendant exercised his right to a jury trial.
28. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.95.050(3) (1989). If the defendant's guilt was
determined by a bench trial or by a guilty plea, the trial court must impanel a jury to
hear the sentencing phase of the trial. Id. § 10.95.050(4).
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ant may make opening and closing arguments and present evi-
dence.29 After the State and the defendant rest, the statute
requires the jury to answer the following question: "Having in
mind the crime of which the defendant has been found guilty,
are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are
not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency?"'  If
the jury unanimously answers "yes," the court must sentence
the defendant to death.3 If the jury cannot reach a unanimous
verdict, or if the jury unanimously answers "no," the court
must sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without pos-
sibility of parole.32
Whenever a trial court sentences a defendant to death, the
Washington Supreme Court conducts a mandatory review of
the sentence.33 The court must determine the following: 1)
whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the jury's determi-
nation that there are not sufficient mitigating factors to merit
leniency; 2) whether the sentence is excessive or disproportion-
ate to the penalty imposed in similar cases; and 3) whether the
jury allowed passion or prejudice to influence its verdict. 4 If
the court decides all three questions against the defendant,
then the supreme court remands the case to the trial court for
issuance of a death warrant. 35
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
As noted above, the United States Supreme Court has held
that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit imposition of
the death penalty on juveniles who were sixteen or seventeen
at the time of the offense.36 State constitutions may, however,
provide greater protection to individual rights than corre-
sponding federal constitutional provisions.37
29. Id. § 10.95.060(2). In its case in chief, the State is limited to presenting
evidence that relates to the statutory aggravating factors and evidence of the
defendant's record of convictions. State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash. 2d 631, 640-43, 683
P.2d 1079, 1085-87 (1984) (Bartholomew II). The State may also rebut any mitigating
evidence that the defendant offers. 101 Wash. 2d at 642, 683 P.2d at 1087. The
defendant may present any relevant mitigating evidence. Id.
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.060(4) (1989).
31. Id. §§ 10.95.060(4), 10.95.080(1).
32. Id. § 10.95.080(2).
33. Id. § 10.95.100.
34. Id § 10.95.130(2).
35. Id. §§ 10.95.140(2), 10.95.160.
36. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
37. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (holding that
California court may interpret the California Constitution as providing greater
[Vol. 15:361
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In State v. Gunwall,' the Washington Supreme Court
sought to establish a principled basis for determining when
courts should reject federal precedent in favor of an independ-
ent state constitutional interpretation. 9 In Washington, two
stages of analysis must be completed by the court in determin-
ing whether the state constitution provides greater protections.
First, the court must determine whether the Washington Con-
stitution's protections against "cruel" punishment are broader
than those against "cruel and unusual" punishment in the
Eighth Amendment. If the court finds Washington's protec-
tions broader, it must then- determine whether those protec-
tions are broad enough to prohibit the imposition of the
juvenile death penalty. The following sections conclude that
the Washington Constitution's protections are broad enough to
preclude the juvenile death penalty.
A. The Gunwall Analysis
The majority in Gunwall criticized courts that simply
"announce that their decision is based on the state constitution
but do not further explain it."'  To counter this tendency, the
court identified six nonexclusive factors that Washington state
courts must examine when deciding whether to interpret a
state constitutional provision more expansively than its federal
counterpart: 41
protection to leafleteers than does the First Amendment); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714, 719 (1975) (holding that Oregon court may interpret Oregon Constitution as
providing greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than does the
Fourth Amendment); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 817, 676 P.2d 419, 421 (1984)
(Washington Constitution's privacy provision provides greater protection against
unreasonable search and seizure than does the Fourth Amendment); Alderwood
Assocs. v. Washington Environmental Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 238, 635 P.2d 108, 113
(1981) (Washington Constitution's free speech provision provides greater protection
than does the First Amendment). See generally William J. Brennan, Jr. State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977)
(encouraging state courts to interpret their constitutions more broadly in response to a
perceived narrowing of federal constitutional protections).
38. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 60, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986).
39. Id. The issue in Gunwal was whether the use of a pen register (a device for
the recording of phone numbers dialed from a specific telephone) violates the state
constitutional right to privacy. The court first held that the state constitution's privacy
clause provides greater protection to an individual's right to privacy than the Fourth
Amendment to the federal constitution. Id. at 64-67, 720 P.2d at 814-15. The court
then decided that the state constitution prohibits the warrantless use of a pen register.
Id. at 68, 720 P.2d at 816.
40. Id. at 60, 720 P.2d at 812.
41. Id. at 61, 720 P.2d at 812.
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1) the text of the state constitution;
2) the significant differences in the texts of parallel provi-
sions of the federal and state constitutions;
3) the history of the state's constitutional and common law;
4) the pre-existing state law;
5) the significant differences in the structures of the federal
and state constitutions; and
6) the presence or absence of particular state interests or
local concerns.
42
To determine whether a given state constitutional provi-
sion is more protective of individual rights than the federal
constitution, the supreme court has consistently analyzed all
six Gunwall factors.4 3 Furthermore, the court has repeatedly
refused to consider state constitutional issues absent sufficient
briefing of the Gunwall factors. 44 The court's recurring refer-
ences to all six factors indicate that a rejection of federal pre-
cedent is principled only when it follows an analysis of all the
Gunwall criteria. The following section demonstrates that all
six Gunwall factors support holding that Article 1, Section 14
of the Washington Constitution provides greater protection
than does the Eighth Amendment.
B. Application of Gunwall to Article 1, Section 14'
The first Gunwall factor examines the textual language
of the state constitution.' Article 1, Section 14 of the Wash-
42. Id. at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13. The court's characterization of the six factors
as "nonexclusive" leaves open the possibility that other factors might be considered in
appropriate cases. To date, however, the court has not considered any other factors.
43. See, e.g., State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990) (analyzing
whether state constitution's privacy provision provides greater protection than does
the Fourth Amendment); State v. Reece, 110 Wash. 2d 766, 757 P.2d 947 (1988)
(examining whether state constitution's free speech section provides broader
protection than does the First Amendment), cert denied, 493 U.S. 812 (1989); State v.
Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 743 P.2d 240 (1987) (analyzing whether state constitutional
right to a jury trial provides greater protection than the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
44. See, e.g., In re Mota, 114 Wash. 2d 465, 472, 788 P.2d 538, 542 (1990); State v.
Motherwell, 114 Wash. 2d 353, 368-69, 788 P.2d 1066, 1074 (1990).
45. It might be argued that the court does not need to engage in a Gunwall
analysis of Article 1, Section 14. In State v. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980),
a pre-Gunwall case, the court held that the state constitution's ban on cruel
punishment does provide greater protection than the Eighth Amendment. Thus Fain
may be dispositive of the issue. The court in Fain, however, did not engage in the
extensive analysis that Gunwall requires. Therefore, the current court may find
Fain's reasoning unpersuasive. This section argues, however, that an analysis of the
Gunwall factors leads to the same conclusion the court reached in Fain.
46. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986).
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ington Constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment
inflicted." Thus, in the context of juvenile death penalties, the
focus of Article I, Section 14 is on whether the punishment is
"cruel."
The second Gunwall factor asks whether any significant
differences exist between parallel provisions of the state and
federal constitutions. 47 Any differences may warrant reliance
on the state provision." The Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." The key difference between
the state and federal provisions is that the state constitution
prohibits cruel punishment while the federal constitution pro-
hibits cruel and unusual punishment. In fact, the framers of
the Washington Constitution specifically rejected an amend-
ment to add the word "unusual" to Article 1, Section 14.
This distinction favors interpreting Article 1, Section 14
independently from interpretations of the Eighth Amendment
for two reasons. First, the framers' rejection of the Eighth
Amendment language indicates an intent not to be bound by
Eighth Amendment analysis.' Second, on its face the state
constitutional language prohibits all cruel punishments. It
therefore provides broader protection than the federal consti-
tution, which prohibits only those punishments that are both
cruel and unusual.5' Thus, because state constitutional protec-
tions are broader, interpretations of the Eighth Amendment do
not dictate the outcome in cases analyzing Article 1, Section 14.
The third Gunwall factor examines whether state consti-
tutional and common law history reflect an intention to confer
greater protection under the state constitution. 2 The court in
Gunwall found it unnecessary to discuss the common law
aspect of this factor.m Instead, the court noted that the fram-
ers had rejected a proposal to adopt language identical to that
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 501-
02 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow ed. 1962).
50. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d at 393, 617 P.2d at 723.
51. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2687 (1991).
52. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61, 720 P.2d at 812.
53. Id. at 65, 720 P.2d at 814.
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of the Fourth Amendment.5' The court concluded that the
framers' action supported interpreting the state constitution to
provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment.'
Similarly, as noted above, the framers also rejected lan-
guage identical to the Eighth Amendment. 6 Under the rea-
soning of Gunwall, therefore, the history of Article 1, Section
14, indicates an intention to distinguish it from the Eighth
Amendment.57
The fourth Gunwall factor addresses whether pre-existing
state law, including statutory law, provides a basis for inter-
preting the state constitutional provision more expansively
than its federal counterpart.' The court in Gunwall noted
that pre-existing state law helps define the scope of a constitu-
tional right.5 9 In Gunwall, the issue was whether the use of a
pen register violated the state constitutional right to privacy.60
In analyzing that question, the court noted that Washington
statutes provide greater protection of the privacy of telephone
users than comparable federal statutes.61 The court concluded
that the stronger state statutory protections supported the
court's resort to an independent state constitutional analysis of
the privacy issue.62
Similarly, Washington death penalty statutes clearly pro-
vide greater protection than their federal counterparts with
respect to proportionality review.63 The purpose of porportion-
ality review is to protect against the arbitrary imposition of
death sentences."' Neither federal statutes nor the Eighth
54. Id. at 65-66, 720 P.2d at 814-15.
55. Id. at 66, 720 P.2d at 815.
56. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
57. In Fain, the court focused on that distinction and held that Article 1, Section
14 provides greater protection than the Eighth Amendment. State v. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d
387, 392-93, 617 P.2d 720, 723 (1980). See supra note 45. See also State v. Bartholomew,
101 Wash. 2d 631, 639-40, 683 P.2d 1079, 1085 (1984) (Bartholomew II) (holding that the
state constitution's cruel punishment and due process clauses provide greater
protection at capital sentencing than their federal counterparts).
58. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61-62, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986).
59. Id. at 62, 720 P.2d at 812.
60. Id. at 63, 720 P.2d at 813.
61. Id. at 66, 720 P.2d at 815.
62. Id.
63. Compare e.g. 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(q) (West Supp. 1991) (describing appellate
review in federal death penalty case) with WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.95.100-.130 (1989)
(describing state court review).
64. State v. Harris, 106 Wash. 2d 784, 797, 725 P.2d 975, 982 (1986), cert denied, 480
U.S. 940 (1987).
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Amendment require proportionality analysis.' Washington
statutes, however, do mandate such a review.66 Therefore,
Washington's statute provides broader protection against arbi-
trary sentencing than its federal counterpart. Following the
reasoning in Gunwall, Washington's stronger statutory protec-
tion of an offender's right to proportionality review supports
an independent interpretation of the state constitution.
Other pre-existing law also indicates that the court should
look to the state constitution to decide whether the death pen-
alty as applied to juveniles is cruel. For instance, the state leg-
islature has established a juvenile court system6 7 that provides
substantial protection to juvenile offenders. One of the princi-
ple focuses of this system is the rehabilitation of juveniles. 6s
This system also reflects the legislature's long-standing effort
to avoid accusing and convicting juveniles of crimes. 69 Thus,
pre-existing state law reveals this state's long history of pro-
tecting juveniles from harsh, adult penalties and supports a
finding that the court should look to state law when evaluating
the constitutionality of juvenile penalties.
The fifth Gunwall factor focuses on the differences in the
structure and purpose of the state and federal constitutions.7 °
State constitutions limit the otherwise plenary powers of state
governments, while the federal constitution grants specific lim-
ited powers to the federal government.71 The Washington
Supreme Court has consistently concluded that this distinction
between the two constitutions always favors independent state
constitutional analysis.7 2
65. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1984).
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (1989). Perhaps because the statute
requires proportionality review, the Washington Supreme Court has never decided
whether the state constitution also mandates such a comparison. The court has,
however, indicated that proportionality review is a part of Article 1, Section 14
analysis. State v. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d 387, 396, 617 P.2d 720, 725 (1980) ("[A] punishment
clearly permissible for some crimes may be unconstitutionally disproportionate for
others").
67. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 13.04 (1989).
68. State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 15, 743 P.2d 240, 247 (1987).
69. Id.
70. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 66, 720 P.2d 808, 815 (1986).
71. See e.g., State v. Reece, 110 Wash. 2d 766, 780, 757 P.2d 947, 955 (1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 812 (1989).
72. See e.g., id. at 780, 757 P.2d at 955; Gunwal, 106 Wash. 2d at 66, 720 P.2d at 815.
See generally Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System:
Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REv. 491, 497 (1984) (arguing for and explaining the broader scope of
the Washington Declaration of Rights vis-a-vis the federal constitution).
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Finally, the sixth Gunwall factor inquires whether the
subject matter in question is of particular state interest or local
concern.7" In this case, the general question is whether the
state constitution limits the state's ability to impose a particu-
lar punishment. To determine whether the cruel punishment
clause prohibits a certain penalty, Washington courts look to
contemporary standards of decency in Washington.74 Deciding
what punishment is in keeping with the contemporary stan-
dards of the people of Washington is certainly a matter of par-
ticular state concern.
More specifically, the question in the instant case is
whether imposing the death penalty on juveniles is a matter of
particular state interest. As discussed above,7 5 the state's statu-
tory juvenile justice system evidences the state's particular
interest in the handling of juvenile offenders. The state's
interest in its children is also reflected in other statutes. The
legislature has passed laws to protect children from mistreat-
ment 76 and to require parents to provide for their children.
77
Furthermore, the legislature specifically declared that "[t]he
children of the state of Washington are the state's greatest
resource.""8 It is clear that the welfare of juveniles is a matter
of particular state interest. It follows, therefore, that the
determination of what penalty to impose upon a juvenile for a
criminal offense is a matter of particular state interest.
Under this sixth factor, Washington courts also examine
whether there is a need for national uniformity on the issue in
question.79 Both the United States Supreme Court and the
Washington Supreme Court have declared that there is no
need for national uniformity in the handling of juvenile
offenders.8 0 Thus, this factor also favors an independent state
constitutional interpretation.
This review of the Gunwall factors establishes that the
Washington Supreme Court should interpret Article 1, Section
14 to provide greater protection than the Eighth Amendment.
73. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 67, 720 P.2d at 815.
74. State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 34, 691 P.2d 929, 947 (1984), cert denied, 471
U.S. 1094 (1985).
75. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
76. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26, 44 (1989).
77. Id. ch. 26.20.
78. 1985 Wash. Laws, ch. 259, § 1.
79. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 62, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (1986).
80. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971); accord State v. Schaaf, 109
Wash. 2d 1, 16, 743 P.2d 240, 247 (1987).
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The question then becomes whether the state constitution's
broader protection prohibits the execution of juveniles. The
following section concludes that it does.
C Article 1, Section 14, and the Juvenile Death Penalty
In State v. Fain,"' the Washington Supreme Court set out
a four-part test for analyzing whether a punishment violates
Article 1, Section 14. The court looks at the following: (1) the
nature of the offense; (2) the legislative purpose behind imposi-
tion of the challenged punishment; (3) the punishment the
offender would receive in other jurisdictions for the same
offense; and (4) the punishment meted out for other offenses
in Washington. 2 An analysis of these factors leads to the con-
clusion that Article 1, Section 14 prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty on juveniles.
In a recent Article 1, Section 14 case, however, the court
did not apply the Fain test. In State v. Farmer,3 the court
held that an exceptional sentence 4 does not violate the state
constitution where the sentence is less than the maximum
allowed under the statute.85 The court noted that "only pun-
ishment which is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the
offense violates the state and federal constitutional guaranty
against cruel and unusual punishment. 'A punishment is
grossly disproportionate only if... the punishment is clearly
arbitrary and shocking to the sense of justice.' "I The court in
Farmer made no reference to Fain.87
81. 94 Wash. 2d 387, 397, 617 P.2d 720, 726 (1980).
82. Id.; accord State v. Gibson, 16 Wash. App. 119, 125-26, 553 P.2d 131, 136 (1976).
83. 116 Wash. 2d 414, 434, 805 P.2d 200, 210 (1991).
84. Washington statutes establish a standard range of sentences for every crime.
See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9.94A.310-9.94A.370 (1989). The standard range includes a
minimum and a maximum sentence. Any imposed sentence that goes outside the
standard range is an exceptional sentence. Id. § 9.94A.390.
85. Farmer, 116 Wash. 2d at 434, 805 P.2d at 211. A jury convicted Farmer of two
counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and two counts of patronizing a juvenile
prostitute. Id. at 418-19, 805 P.2d at 202. The top end of the standard range for those
convictions under Washington's sentencing guidelines is forty-one months. Id. at 434,
805 P.2d at 210. The trial court sentenced Farmer to an exceptional sentence of ninety
months. The maximum sentence allowable, however, is 360 months. Id.
86. Id. at 433, 805 P.2d at 210 (quoting State v. Smith, 93 Wash. 2d 329, 344-45, 610
P.2d 869, 873, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 873 (1980) (citations omitted)).
87. See also State v. Massey, 60 Wash. App. 131, 803 P.2d 340, rev. denied, 115
Wash. 2d 1021 (1990) (analyzing Article 1, Section 14 claim with no reference to Fain);
State v. Creekmore, 55 Wash. App. 852, 783 P.2d 1068 (1989), rev. denied, 114 Wash. 2d
1020 (1990) (analyzing Article 1, Section 14 claim with no reference to Fain). But see
State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 32, 691 P.2d 929 (1984) (applying Fain test in death
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One way to reconcile Farmer and Fain is to assume that a
punishment that is not "clearly arbitrary and shocking to the
sense of justice" can also never be found "cruel" under the
Fain test. Perhaps the court's reliance in Farmer on a visceral
test of what shocks the court's sense of justice is a recognition
that "[mIore than any other provision in the Constitution the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment depends largely,
if not entirely, upon the humanitarian instincts of the
judiciary."'
It may be true that the court's visceral reaction to a pen-
alty is part of its cruel punishment analysis. Washington
courts have repeatedly looked to see if a punishment shocks
the conscience to determine whether that punishment violates
the constitution. Those courts have not, however, given any
guidance on when punishment shocks the conscience. As a
result, this Farmer visceral test does not help future courts
determine when a punishment is unconstitutionally cruel.
Fain, on the other hand, provides a principled method for
determining whether a given sentence is unconstitutional.
This more reasoned test better protects the offender from
cruel punishments. The test also more effectively guards
against judges' basing their decisions solely on emotional
responses to particular punishments. As the court pointed out
in Fain, it is important to use "objective standards" to mini-
mize the possibility that judges' personal preferences will dic-
tate the outcomes of cases.8 9 Finally, the Fain test better
recognizes that the supreme court should generally defer to
the legislative power to prescribe punishments. Applying the
Fain test assures that courts will base their decisions on princi-
pled, objective factors, instead of visceral, subjective ones. The
Washington Supreme Court should, therefore, apply the Fain
four-part test in analyzing whether the juvenile death penalty
violates Article 1, Section 14.
1. Factor 1: Nature of the Offense
Under the Fain four-part test, the court first examines the
nature of the offense.' ° The court clearly implies that this
penalty context), and Harris v. Kastama, 98 Wash. 2d 765, 769, 657 P.2d 1388, 1390, cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 844 (1983) (applying Fain test in other sentencing context).
88. Naovarth v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 947 (Nev. 1989) (citations omitted).
89. State v. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d 387, 397, 617 P.2d 720, 725 (1980).
90. Id.
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prong refers to the amount of harm the offender caused.9 '
Thus, the focus of this factor is on the victim, not the defend-
ant. A murderer causes the ultimate harm of death; therefore,
no penalty is per se disproportionate to the harm caused. 2
2. Factor 2: Legislative Purpose Behind the Penalty
The second Fain factor analyzes whether a penalty serves
the legislative purposes behind that penalty's enactment. 3
The two societal purposes most often cited as supporting the
death penalty are retribution and deterrence. 4 This section
first argues that, because juveniles are less culpable for their
crimes than are adults, the penalty serves no retributive pur-
pose. This section then argues that, because juveniles are inca-
pable of making the type of cost-benefit analysis necessary to
support the general deterrence theory, the penalty serves no
deterrent purpose. Therefore, neither legislative goal supports
imposing the death penalty on juveniles, and the death penalty
is per se disproportionate as applied to them.
According to the United States Supreme Court, retribution
is a permissible goal of the death penalty because it is "an
expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive
conduct."9 5 Retribution justifies the death penalty, however,
only where it is warranted by the "personal responsibility and
moral guilt" of the offender. 6 Or, to put it another way, the
death penalty is disproportionate if it is more punishment than
the offender deserves.97
Thus, in Enmund v. Florida,98 the Supreme Court vacated
the death penalty for an accomplice who neither killed nor
intended to kill.' The Court reasoned that the accomplice was
less culpable, and therefore, the death penalty did not "mea-
91. Id. at 398, 617 P.2d at 726.
92. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d at 31, 691 P.2d at 946. As I argue below, however, the
death penalty is per se disproportionate when applied to juveniles because of factors
related to the culpability of juvenile offenders. See infra notes 95-118 and
accompanying text.
93. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d at 397, 617 P.2d at 726.
94. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836 (1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 798 (1982); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976); Victor L. Streib, The Eighth
Amendment and Capital Punishment of Juveniles, 34 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 363, 390
(1986).
95. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
96. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
97. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
98. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
99. Id.
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surably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the
criminal gets his just deserts."'"
Similarly, in Ford v. Wainwright,'' the Supreme Court
held that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of some-
one who is insane at the time of execution. The Court rea-
soned that imposing the death penalty on the insane serves no
retributive purpose because the crimes of the insane are of a
different "moral quality."' °2 Implicit in the Court's reasoning
is the concept that the insane are less culpable than the sane.
Juveniles are also less culpable for their crimes."0 3 There-
fore, under the reasoning of Enmund and Ford, imposing the
death penalty on juveniles does not further the goal of retribu-
tion. As a result, the death penalty is disproportionate to the
juveniles' crimes. Because a disproportionate punishment is
always "cruel,' 1° 4 executing juveniles violates Article 1, Sec-
tion 14.
Juveniles are less culpable for their crimes for several rea-
sons. First, juveniles are less mature both in their ability to
make sound judgments and in their moral development. 105
Second, juveniles are less able to control their conduct and to
recognize the consequences of their acts.1 6 Third, juveniles
are "in a developmental stage characterized by defiance of
authority and conducive to criminal activity."'0 7 By restricting
a juvenile's right to vote, 08 to serve on a jury, °9 or to marry
without parental consent, Washington statutes implicitly recog-
nize the difference in maturity levels between adults and
juveniles.110
100. Id.
101. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
102. Id. at 408.
103. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988). See also Streib, supra note
94, at 392; Lawrence A. Vanore, Note, The Decency of Capital Punishment for Minors:
Contemporary Standards and the Dignity of Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 786-87 (1986);
Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic ffects of International
Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655, 673
(1983); Helene B. Greenwald, Comment, Capital Punishment for Minors: An Eighth
Amendment Analysis, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1471, 1493 (1983).
104. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2687 (1991).
105. Greenwald, supra note 103, at 1493.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1494. This stage usually passes when offenders reach their early
twenties. Id.
108. WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (amended by WASH. CONST. amend. 63).
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.36.070 (1989).
110. Id. § 26.04.210.
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As the Supreme Court recognized in Thompson v.
Oklahoma, such statutes are relevant in determining the scope
of the Eighth Amendment as applied to juveniles.'11 Justice
O'Connor's concurrence noted that "[t]he special qualitative
characteristics of juveniles that justify legislatures in treating
them differently from adults for many purposes are also rele-
vant to the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis. '11 2
The above factors lead to the conclusion that juveniles are
less culpable for their crimes.1 3 This conclusion is not meant
to make light of the severity of some juvenile crimes. Instead,
it merely acknowledges that juveniles have less capacity to
control their conduct and to think in long-range terms than do
adults. Because juvenile offenders are less culpable, imposing
the death penalty on them serves no retributive purpose." 4
Execution of juveniles also serves no general deterrence
purpose. 1 5 This is so for two reasons. First, a juvenile is
unlikely to make the type of cost-benefit analysis that is neces-
sary for deterrence to work."' Second, even if the juvenile did
engage in such analysis, "it is fanciful to believe that he would
be deterred by the knowledge that a small number of persons
his age have been executed during the 20th century.""' 7
Consequently, imposing the death penalty on juveniles
does not further the goals of retribution and deterrence and,
therefore, serves no valid societal purpose."18 Because the exe-
cution of juveniles serves no valid societal purpose, the analysis
under the second Fain factor leads to the conclusion that Arti-
111. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 824-25 (1988) (plurality opinion of
Stevens, J., with Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring); id. at 854
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 854. In determining the appropriateness of imposing the death penalty
on juveniles, it seems particularly relevant that, lacking a right to vote or sit on a jury,
juveniles are unable to participate in the political or judicial processes that ultimately
determine whether the death penalty should apply to them.
113. Id. at 835 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
114. Id. at 836-37; see also Naovarth v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 948 (Nev. 1989) (holding
life imprisonment without parole serves no retributive purpose as applied to thirteen-
year-old offender).
115. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837-38; Streib, supra note 94, at 394-95; Vanore, supra
note 103, at 788-89; Maria M. Homan, Note, The Juvenile Death Penalty: Counsel's Role
in the Development of a Mitigation Defense, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 779-81 (1987).
116. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837-38.
117. Id.
118. See Streib, supra note 94, at 392; Vanore, supra note 103, at 786-87; Hartman,
supra note 103, at 673; Greenwald, supra note 103, at 1493; Homan, supra note 115, at
779-81.
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cle 1, Section 14 forbids the imposition of the death penalty on
juveniles.
The court in Fain, however, did not expressly examine
this second factor." 9 Instead, the court warned that this factor
should be "employed with caution" and that courts should give
the "greatest possible deference" to legislative determinations
of appropriate penalties for criminal acts.' ° In regard to juve-
nile death sentences, however, that warning is inapplicable
because the legislature has not spoken on the application of
the death penalty for juvenile offenders.
The Washington death penalty statute sets no minimum
age for imposition of the death penalty. The legislative history
of that statute contains no discussion of its possible application
to juveniles. Thus, there is no indication that the legislature
specifically determined that imposing the death penalty on
juveniles serves any societal purpose. Without such an indica-
tion, there is no legislative determination to which the court
should defer.
Furthermore, in spite of the Fain court's warning regard-
ing deference to the legislature, the seriousness of imposing
the death penalty requires the court to examine whether the
penalty furthers any permissible societal goal. As the United
States Supreme Court noted: "Unless the death penalty when
applied to those in [defendant's] position contributes measura-
bly to [retribution or deterrence], it 'is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' and
hence an unconstitutional punishment."''
Thus, the Washington court must examine the relation-
ship between the punishment and the goals that punishment is
intended to promote. Imposing the death penalty on juveniles
does not further the state's goals of retribution and deterrence.
Therefore, that penalty is unconstitutional under the second
Fain factor.
119. State v. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d 387, 401-02 n.7, 617 P.2d 720, 728 n.7 (1980).
120. Id.
121. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
at 592); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 331 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(holding that a punishment is excessive if it serves no valid legislative purpose);
Vanore, supra note 103, at 783 (arguing that a punishment is excessive if it fails to
make a measurable contribution to penological goals).
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3. Factor 3: Punishment That the Offender Would Receive
in Other Jurisdictions
The third Fain factor examines the punishment an
offender would receive in other jurisdictions for a similar
offense. This factor is somewhat problematic. Presumably, the
goal of a separate state constitutional analysis under Article 1,
Section 14 is to determine the standards of the people of Wash-
ington. The actions of legislatures in other states seem irrele-
vant to that question. Nonetheless, the court has consistently
looked at other states' punishments for guidance when analyz-
ing Article 1, Section 14.22 In keeping with precedent, there-
fore, examining how other states punish juvenile murderers
must be part of the Article 1, Section 14 analysis.
Determining what penalty a juvenile would face in
another jurisdiction is difficult. For instance, eighteen states
provide for the death penalty but make no reference in their
statutes to whether the penalty applies to juveniles. 23 In addi-
tion, there is no clear Supreme Court mandate on the applica-
bility of the penalty in those states. However, a plurality in
Stanford v. Kentucky determined that a juvenile could face the
death penalty in those jurisdictions. 2 4 The plurality reasoned
that each of those eighteen states had statutes allowing
juveniles to be tried as adults, and therefore, juveniles in those
states could face the full range of adult penalties."
The plurality's reasoning in Stanford is unsound. There is
no evidence that the state legislatures in question specifically
considered whether the death penalty should apply to
juveniles. As one court noted, "[t]he imposition of capital pun-
ishment can occur only pursuant to an affirmative and con-
scious decision 'by a democratically elected legislature,"26 and
surely not through inadvertence .... Failure on our part to
insist on some indicia of such an exercise [of legislative judg-
ment] would... 'authorize death by legislative oversight.' "127
That a state statute provides for trying some juveniles as
adults does not demonstrate the legislature's affirmative deci-
122. See State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 32, 691 P.2d 929, 940 (1984); State v.
Fain, 94 Wash. 2d 387, 399, 617 P.2d 720, 726 (1980).
123. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 385 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 372.
125. Id. at 371 n.3.
126. State v. Bey, 548 A.2d 846, 875 (N.J. 1988) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 175 (1976)).
127. Bey/, 548 A.2d at 875.
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sion to extend the death penalty to them. As Justice O'Connor
recognized,
there is a considerable risk that [the legislature] either did
not realize that [its] actions would have the effect of render-
ing [juvenile] defendants death-eligible or did not give the
question the serious consideration that would have been
exemplified by the explicit choice of some minimum age for
death-eligibility.
128
The Washington Supreme Court should adopt the reason-
ing set forth in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Thompson
and reiterated by the four dissenters in Stanford. 29 That
rationale recognizes that the death penalty should be imposed
only where evidence clearly shows that the legislature engaged
in "the serious and calm reflection that ought to precede any
decision of such gravity and finality."'" Only in this way can
the court assure that juveniles are not subjected to the death
penalty through legislative oversight.
Under the reasoning of the plurality in Thompson, a juve-
nile cannot face the death penalty in twenty-six states, nor the
District of Columbia. Fourteen states and the District of
Columbia prohibit capital punishment altogether.' Twelve
states that allow the death penalty prohibit its imposition on
juveniles.1 32 By contrast, only six states have established a
minimum age of either sixteen or seventeen for the imposition
of the death penalty.'3 3 Thus, only six jurisdictions specifically
allow the execution of juveniles, while twenty-seven prohibit
128. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 857 (1988). See also State v. Stone, 535
So. 2d 362, 364-65 (La. 1988) (finding that statute permitting trial of juvenile in
criminal court did not demonstrate a "conscious, deliberate decision" by the legislature
to impose death penalty on defendant).
129. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1989); See also Thompson, 487
U.S. at 828-29 (plurality opinion arguing that the Court should only look at those states
which have expressly established a minimum age in their death penalty statutes).
130. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 856 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131. Those states are Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 826-28 n.25; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 384
n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132. Those states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee.
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 n.2.
133. Georgia (age seventeen), Indiana (age sixteen), Kentucky (age sixteen),
Nevada (age sixteen), North Carolina (age seventeen), and Texas (age seventeen).
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829-30 n.30.
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such punishment.134
Furthermore, the recent trend among the states is to
exclude juveniles from death penalty statutes. Between 1981
and 1987, five states passed death penalty statutes that forbid
capital punishment for juveniles.1 3 5
In considering the punishment a juvenile would receive in
other jurisdictions, the court should look at more than just
other states' statutes. Any analysis of this factor should also
examine the frequency with which juries in those jurisdictions
actually impose the death penalty on juveniles. Nationally, of
more than 14,000 legal executions between 1642 and 1983, only
287 people were executed for crimes committed when they
were under the age of eighteen.' From 1983 to 1986, the over-
all death row population increased by forty-two percent, while
the death row juvenile population decreased by sixteen per-
cent. 3 7 Juveniles committed over nine percent of all murders
between 1973 and 1983, yet they received only two-to-three
percent of all death sentences.'l 8 Thus, the trend nationwide is
toward forbidding the imposition of the death penalty on
juveniles.
While the court in Fain did not examine foreign law in
determining what penalty an offender would face in other
jurisdictions, it is worth noting that the vast majority of coun-
tries prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on
juveniles. 139  From 1980 to 1986, Amnesty International
134. Eighteen of the remaining states have statutes that provide for the death
penalty but do not indicate whether that penalty applies to juveniles. For the reasons
discussed earlier, those statutes do not provide guidance as to the acceptability of the
juvenile death penalty. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. The
nineteenth state, South Dakota, statutorily provides for the death penalty but has
sentenced no one to death since the United States Supreme Court decided Furman v.
Georgia. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 384 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, South Dakota is
generally considered as having abandoned the death penalty. Id.
135. Those states are Colorado, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, and Oregon. Homan,
supra note 115, at 776 n.78.
136. Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American Experience With
Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L.
REV. 613, 618-19 (1983).
137. Streib, supra note 94, at 384.
138. Id. at 384-87.
139. See generally Laura Dalton, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v.
Missouri: A Violation of an Emerging Rule of Customary International Law, 32 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 161 (1990); Lisa K. Arnett, Comment, Death at an Early Age:
International Law Arguments Against the Death Penalty, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 245
(1988); Hartman, supra note 103.
The plurality in Stanford refused to consider foreign law. 492 U.S. at 369 n.1. ("[Ilt
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reported only eight people executed world-wide for crimes
committed while juveniles: three of these occurred in the
United States, two in Pakistan, and one each in Bangladesh,
Barbados, and Rwanda."4
In sum, the Washington Supreme Court should hold that
the third Fain factor prohibits the imposition of the death pen-
alty on juveniles. In the United States Supreme Court, the
four dissenters in Stanford, together with Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Thompson, have argued that courts should not
allow the juvenile death penalty absent a specific legislative
enactment. Furthermore, the great majority of legislatures in
the United States that have specifically addressed the question
have prohibited the juvenile death penalty. The vast majority
of countries have determined likewise. Therefore, the court
should hold that, in keeping with international standards of
human decency, and with the trend in the United States, the
Washington Constitution forbids the imposition of the death
penalty on juveniles.
4. Factor 4: Punishment in Washington For Other Offenses
The fourth Fain factor examines the punishment meted
is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive"). Earlier majority opinions of
the Court, however, clearly considered foreign law in determining whether a
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796
n.22 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n. 10 (1977).
140. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNrrED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY
74 (1987). According to Amnesty International, the following jurisdictions have
abolished the death penalty: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Cape Verde, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France,
Germany, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Kampuchea, Kiribati,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Mozambique,
Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Philippines,
Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Sweden,
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. Brief of Amici Curiae for Amnesty International
and Amnesty USA, at Appendix A, State v. Furman, No. 57003-5 (Wash. filed June 4,
1990).
Additionally, the following jurisdictions retain the death penalty, but specifically
prohibit its imposition on juveniles: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and
Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize, Botswana, British Virgin Islands, Brunei
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Cayman Islands, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba,
Dominica, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iraq,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Montserrat, Myanmar, Paraguay, Poland, Qatar, Rwanda,
Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi
Arabia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turks and Caicos Islands, U.S.S.R., United
Arab Emirates, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. Brief of Amici Curiae at Appendix
H.
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out in Washington for other offenses.141 In Fain, the court
employed this factor by comparing Fain's sentence with the
statutory maximum penalties for other offenses." The court
concluded that the penalty imposed on Fain was greater than
the penalty he would have received for more serious crimes.
14 3
Therefore, his sentence was "disproportionate" to his crime.'"
In the death penalty context, however, this fourth Fain
factor should have a different focus. Obviously, no crime is
more serious than taking a life. Therefore, the Fain court's
focus on the penalties imposed for different crimes would be
inappropriate in the instant case. Instead, the court should
examine the punishment meted out to other members of the
defendant's class for similar crimes.
This inquiry is not the same as the proportionality review
mandated by Revised Code of Washington section
10.95.130(2)(b). The statutorily mandated proportionality
review requires the court to perform a "careful examination of
the circumstances of the crimes and the defendants' personal
characteristics.' 45 Thus, the court's focus is on whether impo-
sition of the death penalty on the offender as an individual
violates the constitution. Put another way, the question in pro-
portionality review is whether the penalty is disproportionate
given the particular characteristics of the defendant and the
crime.
In the context of this Article 1, Section 14 challenge to the
death penalty, however, the focus is on the class of defendants.
The question is whether imposition of the death penalty on
juveniles as a class violates the constitution.
Thus, the court should look at what penalty is actually
imposed on juveniles, rather than what punishment the stat-
utes authorize. A legislatively authorized penalty may be so
unacceptable to society that juries refuse to impose it. In that
event, the reluctance to impose the penalty is more indicative
of whether society accepts the penalty than is its legislative
authorization."' Therefore, under this fourth factor, the court
should examine jury sentences. This examination should
determine whether the rarity of the death penalty's imposition
141. State v. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d 387, 401, 617 P.2d 720, 727 (1980).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 402, 617 P.2d at 728.
145. In re Jeffries, 114 Wash. 2d 485, 490, 789 P.2d 731, 736 (1990).
146. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 278-79 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
1992]
384 University of Puget Sound Law Review
on a class of offenders creates an inference that such imposi-
tion is arbitrary, and therefore unconstitutional, with respect
to that class.
147
The examination of jury sentences is facilitated by Revised
Code of Washington section 10.95.120.1" This statute requires
trial courts to submit reports to the Washington Supreme
Court in all cases resulting in a conviction for aggravated first
degree murder. As of July 22, 1991, there were 113 such
reports on file in the Washington Supreme Court Clerk's
office. 1
4 9
From these reports, it is impossible to determine exactly
how many cases involved defendants who were juveniles at the
time of the offense because many of the reports do not list the
birth date of the offender. Those reports that do list the
offender's birth date reveal that seven juveniles have been con-
victed of aggravated first degree murder.'i s In three of those
seven cases, the prosecutor sought the death penalty.'5
Furman's is the only case in which the jury imposed the death
penalty.
Thus, Furman's sentence is unique among all the juveniles
sentenced under the current statute. His sentence is also rare
historically. The State of Washington has executed only three
people for crimes committed while juveniles. 52 Washington's
last juvenile execution occurred in 1932.'15
The rarity with which prosecutors seek, and juries inflict,
the death penalty on juveniles lends force to the argument that
147. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.35 (1988) (plurality opinion); id.
at 852 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148. Enacted by 1981 Wash. Laws, ch. 138, § 12.
149. Those reports are available for public inspection by contacting the Clerk of
the Supreme Court in Olympia, Washington.
150. State v. Furman, No. 57003-5 (Wash. filed June 4, 1990); State v. Stevenson, 55
Wash. App. 725, 780 P.2d 873 (1989); State v. Cummings, 44 Wash. App. 146, 721 P.2d
545 (1986); State v. Rice, No. 88-100427-2 (Yakima Cty. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 5, 1990);
State v. McNeil, No. 88-1-00428-1 (Yakima Cty. Super. Ct. filed March 15, 1988); State
v. Harris, No. 87-1-01354-7 (Pierce Cty. Super. Ct. filed June 12, 1987); State v. Massey,
No. 87-1-01354-7 (Pierce Cty. Super. Ct. filed 1987). Additionally, in at least one case
decided prior to the reporting requirement, a juvenile was convicted of aggravated first
degree murder. State v. Forrester, 21 Wash. App. 855, 587 P.2d 179 (1978).
151. State v. Furman, No. 57003-5 (Wash. filed June 4, 1990); Stevenson, 55 Wash.
App. at 725, 780 P.2d at 873; State v. Rice, No. 88-1-00427-2 (Yakima Cty. Super. Ct.
filed Jan. 5, 1990). In a fourth case, that of Russell McNeil (Rice's co-defendant), the
prosecutor filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty but later withdrew the
notice in exchange for a guilty plea.
152. VICTOR L. STREm, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 207-08 (1987).
153. Id.
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execution of juveniles offends contemporary standards of
decency in Washington. As Justice Scalia points out, however,
this does not necessarily "establish the requisite proposition
that the death sentence for offenders under eighteen is cate-
gorically unacceptable to prosecutors and juries."154 Still,
"[w]hen an unusually severe punishment is authorized for
wide-scale application but not, because of society's refusal,
inflicted save in a few instances, the inference is compelling
that there is a deep-seated reluctance to inflict it."'155
That inference is especially strong considering that capital
juries are "death-qualified," and render a "distinctly weighted
measure of contemporary standards."''1 This reluctance on
the part of juries leads to the conclusion that the final Fain
factor favors holding that Article 1, Section 14 prohibits the
execution of juveniles.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Washington State Constitution prohibits the imposi-
tion of the death penalty on juveniles. First, under the
Gunwall six-factor test, Article 1, Section 14 provides greater
protection to offenders than does the Eighth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. Second, under the four factors set out in
State v. Fain for determining when a punishment is "cruel"
within the meaning of the state constitution, Article 1, Section
14 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles
for several reasons.
The most important of those reasons is that imposing the
death penalty on juveniles does not further any of the societal
goals that justify the use of that penalty. Because juveniles are
less culpable than adults for their crimes, imposing the death
penalty on them serves no retributive purpose. That penalty
also serves no deterrence purpose because juveniles are incapa-
ble of performing the type of cost-benefit analysis that makes
deterrence work.
Additionally, a juvenile could receive the death penalty for
a similar crime in only six other states. In Washington, the
penalty is more severe than any penalty imposed on any juve-
154. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (plurality opinion).
155. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 300 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). See
also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.35 (1988) (plurality opinion); id at 852
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
156. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 387 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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nile since 1932. Furthermore, the Washington legislature has
not specifically considered whether the death penalty should
apply to juveniles. Therefore, the court should hold unconsti-
tutional the imposition of the death penalty on those who were
juveniles at the time of their offense. To do otherwise would
allow imposition of the death penalty by legislative oversight.
Ultimately, by allowing the state to execute juveniles
without specific legislative authorization, the court would be
abandoning its traditional role as protector of individual rights.
There is no justification for the court to abandon that role
because there is no specific legislative mandate to execute
juveniles. The court must ensure that the state does not exe-
cute someone unless that execution is in accordance with a spe-
cific legislative mandate and that execution serves a valid
societal purpose. Because executing juveniles meets neither of
those requirements, Article 1, Section 14 of the Washington
Constitution prohibits the execution of Michael Monroe
Furman.
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